


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3 June 1965



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY



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State Dept. review completed

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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\*Dominican Republic: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT) The loyalist government's outward display of moderation and conciliation, which began on Tuesday, is continuing as the rebels remain on the psychological defensive.

The National Palace was effectively neutralized yesterday when members of the Brazilian contingent in the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) extended the demilitarized zone around the beleaguered building. The palace, which was held by a loyalist force, had been the last remaining area where IAPF troops were not interposed between the forces of the opposing camps.

The rebel Caamano government has evidently rejected the loyalist initiative of Tuesday calling for OAS-supervised elections. After a day in which rebel leaders appeared to be studiously ignoring the proposal, Caamano was said by American reporters yesterday afternoon to have flatly rejected it. Last night the Cuban government's official propaganda agency reported in greater detail on Caamano's attitude. The rebel leader was said to be adamant in his continued insistence that the 1963 constitution must be restored and that any election outside the provisions of that constitution cannot be considered. Caamano is said to have referred to loyalist leader Imbert's proposal as a "farce."

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[redacted]  
[redacted] Communist and pro-Communist individuals and groups remain active in the rebel camp. They remain in control of various rebel militia units guarding points in the rebel-controlled area of the city and are active in propaganda media. There are some indications of growing frictions between the Communists and the non-Communists in the rebel movement.] [redacted]  
(Map)

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Cyprus: [The Greek Cypriots may torpedo Greek-Turkish efforts to make progress toward a Cyprus solution.]

[President Makarios has asked Secretary General Thant to send UN mediator Galo Plaza back to Cyprus to facilitate direct talks between the Cypriots and the Turks. This move appears designed to embarrass Athens, which has tended to ignore the UN recently, and to annoy Ankara which regards Plaza as pro-Greek.]

[Makarios may be seriously interested in promoting direct talks with the Turks, however. He reportedly intends to seek a meeting with Turkish Premier Urguplu at the Afro-Asian conference in Algiers late this month.]


[Athens officials say they have learned that Makarios is about to announce new elections. The Turks have warned that they would vigorously resist such a move. Greek Government leaders, wishing to maintain quiet on the island while Greek-Turkish talks are under way in Athens and Ankara, say they are contemplating a break with Makarios if he persists in holding elections. Previous threats of a break have never materialized, however.]

[Makarios fears the bilateral talks may lead to the granting of undue concessions to Turkey in exchange for enosis--union of the island with Greece. In fact, the Greeks have proposed a final solution based on enosis with some form of compensation for Turkey, but have not yet suggested to the Turks what the compensation might be.]

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Laos: The military situation remains fluid in several areas.

[In the northwest a Communist clearing operation southwest of Nam Tha along Route 3 has apparently stalled. Government guerrilla units are now regrouping in preparation for a counterattack against Vien Pou Kha, which the Communists seized on 25 May.]


To the east in Samneua Province, an uneasy quiet prevails following a series of sharp but futile Communist attempts to dislodge government forces on Route 6 north of Na Khang. Despite the Communists' failure to clear the road, they continue to extend its motorable section southwest of Samneua town. This will facilitate both the supply of troops engaged in the clearing operation and the longer range objective of opening another supply route from North Vietnam to the Plaine des Jarres.

In the panhandle a concentration of enemy forces has been reported in the Muong Pha Lane - Dong Hene area. Only a few minor skirmishes have been reported, but government forces continue to expect attacks on a larger scale.

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\*Congo: Leopoldville has made considerable progress in a new offensive against rebel remnants in the northeast.

On 1 June mercenary-led government forces captured Buta, headquarters of the largest remaining rebel band in that area, where most of the white hostages still in rebel hands were held. Many of the 100-odd hostages are reported to have been killed before the insurgents fled into the forest.

Although only intermittent resistance was encountered, the campaign to clear this region is likely to be a protracted, arduous operation. The local population is traditionally antigovernment, and the insurgents are fairly well armed.

Other clearing operations are progressing well. For the first time since last August a barge convoy recently reached Stanleyville without encountering rebel harassment. Congo Army units which recently occupied Kasongo near the north Katangan border are advancing slowly into the areas west of Fizi which have long been in rebel hands.

The political front is unusually quiet. President Kasavubu recently made his first tour of the hinterland since the rebellion began. Tshombé is visiting Europe.

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Uruguay: The steadily deteriorating political and economic situation in Uruguay is causing concern in Brazil and Argentina.

[The Brazilians believe that Communists have penetrated the government, and that Communist-dominated labor unions and student groups could call a general strike or mount demonstrations which the government could not control. They also fear that the leftists would ultimately be the chief beneficiaries of a rightist or a military take-over of the government.]


[Top-level Brazilian officials are apparently working on contingency plans for military intervention. The Brazilians would intervene, however, only if they felt Communists and extreme leftists were taking over the Uruguayan Government. They have discussed the general situation in Uruguay with the Argentines.]

Uruguayan police have arrested a right wing extremist and have moved to head off efforts by right wing groups bent on generating a climate propitious for a coup. Another symptom of uneasiness is the threat of a member of the governing nine-man plural executive to "expose" three such groups which he claims wish to oust the government by force.

Several new developments may tend to complicate the general situation in Uruguay. A storm of leftist criticism can be expected now that the government has banned a Communist-sponsored Cuban Solidarity Congress which was to convene on 18 June. In addition, a government suspension of imports will tighten the pinch on business and industry and will be felt quickly by a public already dissatisfied with the government's inability to cope with existing problems.

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NOTES

Kashmir: [UN observers in Kashmir are again concerned over incidents along the cease-fire line, especially an Indian attack in mid-May against Pakistani outposts near Kargil which the observers have just investigated. Both sides normally tolerate greater violence in Kashmir than elsewhere along their borders, even when relations are otherwise not strained. Indo-Pakistani bitterness over the last six weeks, however, coupled with unsettled conditions inside Indian Kashmir, has seemed to encourage increased belligerence on the cease-fire line, and there is danger of larger clashes.]

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Bolivia: On the surface the political situation is relatively quiet since antijunta political and labor leaders, fearing arrest and possible deportation, have gone into hiding. The power struggle between junta co-presidents Barrientos and Ovando remains unresolved, however, as each is continuing to maneuver behind the scenes to discredit the other. The government's reorganization of the nationalized mines has begun at certain locations with the army standing by to use force if necessary.

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## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board on 2 June 1965 approved the following national intelligence estimate:

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NIE 22-65, "French Foreign Policy"

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THE PRESIDENT  
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     The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council  
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 The Treasury Department  
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 The Department of Defense  
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     The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)  
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     The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff  
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     Chief of Staff, United States Air Force  
     Chief of Staff, United States Army  
     Commandant, United States Marine Corps  
     U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO  
     Supreme Allied Commander, Europe  
     Commander in Chief, Pacific  
     Commander in Chief, Atlantic  
     The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
     The Director, The Joint Staff  
     The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army  
     The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy  
     The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force  
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